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环境规制下建筑垃圾资源化企业绿色技术创新博弈分析

Game analysis of green technology innovation in construction waste recycling enterprises under environmental regulation
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摘要 为激励建筑垃圾资源化企业进行绿色技术创新实践,构建政府与资源化企业的演化博弈模型,基于学习效应理论和复合型环境规制政策,从内部研发动机和外部监管角度探讨资源化企业绿色技术创新行为选择的演化过程和影响因素,并进行仿真分析。研究显示:在静态补贴和静态碳税复合型政策下,系统无法渐进稳定于中心点;动态补贴和静态碳税、静态补贴和动态碳税、动态补贴和动态碳税3种复合型政策均能使系统演化达到均衡状态;当品牌收益小于阈值5.6时,静态补贴和动态碳税为最优复合型政策;当品牌收益大于阈值5.6时,动态补贴和动态碳税为最优复合型政策;当考虑学习效应时,学习率与政府实施环境规制的概率呈负相关,与资源化企业进行绿色技术创新的概率呈正相关;政府的补贴力度过高,补贴效应出现反转;差异型碳税激励作用显著,但其边际影响逐渐递减。 To encourage green technology innovation in construction waste recycling enterprises,this study constructs an evolutionary game model between the government and recycling enterprises.Based on the learning effect theory and compound environmental regulation policies,the study explores the evolutionary process and influencing factors behind the green technology innovation behavior choices of recycling enterprises.It examines both internal research and development motivation and external supervision,and conducts simulation analysis to understand these dynamics.The research findings indicate that,firstly,under the composite policy of static subsidies and static carbon taxes,the system fails to stabilize at a central point.However,three specific composite policies—dynamic subsidies combined with static carbon taxes,static subsidies paired with dynamic carbon taxes,and dynamic subsidies alongside dynamic carbon taxes—can all facilitate the system's evolution toward an equilibrium state.Secondly,when brand revenue is below the threshold value of 5.6,the optimal composite policy is static subsidies combined with dynamic carbon taxes.Conversely,when brand revenue exceeds this threshold,the optimal composite policy shifts to dynamic subsidies along with dynamic carbon taxes.In addition,the research reveals that the learning effect of innovative research and development investment serves as the internal driving force behind the green technology innovation behavior of recycling enterprises.It can motivate these enterprises to actively pursue green technology innovation,especially when government environmental regulations are relatively lenient.When considering the learning effect,the learning rate is negatively correlated with the probability of the government implementing environmental regulations and positively correlated with the probability of recycling enterprises engaging in green technology innovation.Moreover,it is noteworthy that under the optimal composite policy,as the intensity of government subsidies increases,the stable probability of recycling enterprises engaging in green technology innovation initially rises and then declines.The differential carbon tax policy can significantly stimulate green technology innovation behavior in recycling enterprises in the early stages.However,as the tax rate increases,its marginal impact on the behavioral strategies of recycling enterprises gradually diminishes.
作者 苏义坤 袁紫露 郑志哲 SU Yikun;YUAN Zilu;ZHENG Zhizhe(College of Civil Engineering and Transportation,Northeast Forestry University,Harbin 150040,China)
出处 《安全与环境学报》 2025年第9期3400-3412,共13页 Journal of Safety and Environment
基金 国家重点研发计划项目(2021YFF0602000)。
关键词 环境工程学 环境规制 建筑垃圾 资源化利用 绿色技术创新 environmental engineering environmental regulation construction waste resource utilization green technology innovation
作者简介 苏义坤,教授,博士,从事绿色建筑、固体废物处理与资源化利用研究,yikunsu_nefu@163.com;通信作者:郑志哲,讲师,博士,从事固体废物处理与资源化利用研究,jasworkhard@126.com。

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