税收激励下企业集团内部的经营业务安排:来自总部自营的证据

Business arrangements within business groups under tax incentives:Evidence from headquarter self-operation

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摘要总部自营是中国企业集团的一个典型特征。利用中国资本市场“双重披露制”和法人为主体的纳税制度提供的研究机会,尝试从税收激励视角对此进行经验揭示。研究结果表明,相较于母子公司税率相等的企业集团,母公司税率高的企业集团总部自营程度显著更低,而母公司税率低的企业集团总部自营程度显著更高。在多种稳健性检验下,上述结论仍然成立。进一步研究发现,当母公司处于亏损状态、母公司代理成本较高、企业集团内部信息环境质量较差以及企业集团面临的风险较小时,母公司税率高的企业集团与母子公司税率相等的企业集团总部自营程度之间的差异会缩小,而母公司税率低的企业集团与母子公司税率相等的企业集团总部自营程度之间的差异会扩大。此外,税收激励对总部自营程度的影响在规模较小的企业集团中更明显。文章不仅从总部自营的视角提供了税收激励影响企业(集团)经营决策的新证据,一定程度上弥补了已有研究的不足,还揭示了母子公司税率关系模式影响企业集团总部自营的规律,深化了对中国企业集团“总部自营”现象产生的制度逻辑的理解。 Headquarter self-operation is a typical feature of Chinese business groups.Based on the research opportunities provided by the“dual disclosure system”in the Chinese capital market and the tax payment system with legal person as the main body,this paper attempts to provide empirical evidence from the tax incentive perspective.The results show that compared to business groups with the same tax rate of parent company and subsidiary company,business groups with a higher parent company tax rate have a lower degree of headquarter self-operation,while business groups with a lower parent company tax rate have a higher degree of headquarter self-operation.The above findings remain unchanged under various robustness tests.Further study finds that when the parent company is in a loss position,the agency cost of the parent company is higher,the quality of the information environment within business groups is poor,or the risks faced by business groups are smaller,the difference in the degree of headquarter self-operation between the business groups with a higher parent company tax rate and those with the same tax rate of parent company and subsidiary company decreases,while the difference in the degree of headquarter self-operation between business groups with a lower parent company tax rate and those with the same tax rate of parent company and subsidiary company increases.In addition,the effect of tax incentives on the degree of headquarter self-operation is more significant in business groups with smaller size.This paper not only provides new evidence on the influence of tax incentives on the operating decisions of business groups from the perspective of headquarter self-operation,making up for the deficiencies in existing research to some extent,but also reveals the regularity of how the tax relationship between parent and subsidiary companies within business groups affects the headquarter self-operation,and deepens the understanding of the institutional logic behind the phenomenon of headquarter self-operation of Chinese business groups.

作者王亮亮陈至纯张海洋 WANG Liangliang;CHEN Zhichun;ZHANG Haiyang(Nanjing University,Nanjing 210093;Southeast University,Nanjing 211189)

机构地区南京大学东南大学

出处《财贸研究》北大核心 2025年第7期94-110,共17页 Finance and Trade Research

基金国家自然科学基金项目“税收激励、企业集团内部资本配置及其经济后果——基于中国资本市场‘双重披露制’的研究”(71972036) 国家自然科学基金项目“上市公司所得税会计信息公开披露的经济后果研究——基于‘会计利润与所得税费用调整过程’披露的检验”(72372025) 国家自然科学基金项目“适应数字经济新业态的税收制度体系优化设计”(72442004)。

关键词总部自营税收激励企业集团经营业务安排 headquarter self-operation tax incentives business groups operating business arrangement

分类号 F272.3 [经济管理—企业管理]

作者简介王亮亮(1986-),男,江苏泗阳人,南京大学商学院教授;陈至纯(1999-),女,江苏泗洪人,东南大学经济管理学院硕士生;张海洋(1998-),男,山东金乡人,东南大学经济管理学院博士生。