摘要
公平竞争审查制度打破了行政垄断的束缚,市场竞争环境因此得到优化。对于银行业而言,该制度是经济全球化和金融国际化背景下持续健康发展的重要保障。本文基于2011—2021年全国355家银行的面板数据,以公平竞争审查制度作为准自然实验,运用双重差分法考察了该制度实施对银行风险承担的影响。研究发现,公平竞争审查制度的实施可以显著降低银行风险承担。机制检验发现,公平竞争审查制度主要通过减少影子银行规模和减少信贷集中度,从而降低银行风险承担。
The Fair Competition Review System(FCRS) aims to dismantle administrative monopolies,thereby optimizing the market competition environment.For the banking sector,this system is an important guarantee for sustainable and healthy development in the context of economic globalization and financial internationalization.Using panel data from 355 banks nationwide from 2011 to 2021,this paper takes FCRS as a quasi-natural experiment and employs a difference-in-differences(DID) approach to examine its impact on bank risk-taking.The study finds that the implementation of the FCRS can significantly reduce bank risk-taking.Mechanism tests further show that the FCRS achieves this effect primarily by reducing the scale of shadow banking and decreasing credit concentration,thereby mitigating bank risk-taking behavior.
作者
陈诗雯
徐媛媛
CHEN Shiwen;XU Yuanyuan(School of Economics and Management,Nanjing Forestry University,Nanjing Jiangsu 210037,China)
出处
《对外经贸实务》
2025年第2期108-118,共11页
Practice in Foreign Economic Relations and Trade
关键词
公平竞争审查
银行风险承担
行政垄断
信贷集中
影子银行
fair competition review
bank risk-taking
administrative monopoly
credit concentration
shadow banking
作者简介
陈诗雯(2004-),女,科研助理,从事金融工程与风险管理研究;通信作者:徐媛媛(1993-),女,博士,副教授,从事金融风险管理研究,xuyuan00@outlook.com。
