摘要
党的二十大报告指出,就业是最基本的民生。本文以2014年最高人民法院实施企业破产审理方式改革为准自然实验,研究破产司法改革对企业雇佣决策的影响。研究发现,破产司法改革促进了企业劳动雇佣,相较于未纳入试点地区企业,试点地区企业改革后的雇佣规模平均提升约7.1%。机制检验发现,控制权转移风险提高是破产司法改革促进劳动雇佣的作用渠道,即强势债权人对控制权的威胁推动企业要素投入从资本转向劳动力。本文还发现,由于强势债权人的关注,破产司法改革对企业薪酬支出没有显著影响,仅推动企业追求劳动雇佣规模的扩张而非人力资本的升级。本文拓展了中国破产司法改革经济后果的研究,从法治建设的角度为稳就业提供了政策启示。
Employment is the cornerstone of social stability and economic development.However,challenges such as automation,structural adjustments,external shocks,and the COVID-19 pandemic have intensified employment pressures in China,requiring urgent policies to promote youth employment.In response,the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China proposed an employment-first strategy to enhance employment policies.As major contributors to employment,firms require incentives and capacities to maintain stable labor engagement.However,employment stabilization policies can lead to government intervention in market exits,especially when bankruptcy processes fail to rescue distressed firms or properly reallocate employees.Local governments tend to support financially troubled firms for social stability.Although this support prevents market exits in the short term,it can foster“zombie firms”crowding out employment growth in viable firms and suppressing long-term economic growth.Compared to governmental interventions,rule-of-law-based mechanisms are better suited to uphold market principles.Nevertheless,whether legal reforms can address employment stabilization effectively remains uncertain,as the existing literature provides limited insights on this issue.This study examines the relationship between the construction of corporate exit institutions and employment,leveraging the 2014 pilot program for reforming bankruptcy adjudication initiated by The Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China.Using firm-level data from 2009 to 2019,this study employs a difference-in-differences model to evaluate the impact of the reform on employment by listed firms.The results reveal that the reform promoted firm employment,with firms in pilot regions experiencing an average increase in employment of approximately 7.1%relative to firms in non-pilot regions.Mechanism analyses indicate that the increase in control transfer risks is the main channel.Specifically,the threat of control by powerful creditors prompts firms to shift their input demand from capital to labor.Heterogeneity analyses reveal that the job promotion effects were particularly pronounced in firms with high capital intensity,elevated pre-reform default risks,significant insider ownership,and easily enforceable assets,as well as those in regions with heightened political promotion pressures.Finally,the study finds that,due to the influence of powerful creditors,the bankruptcy judicial reform did not significantly impact total cash expenditure for compensation,instead driving firms to expand employment scale rather than upgrade human capital.This study makes three key contributions to the literature on the economic impacts of China’s bankruptcy judicial reform.First,it shifts the focus from the capital market to the labor market,offering new insights into how legal reforms influence employment decisions.Second,leveraging the quasi-natural experiment of the 2014 pilot program for reforming bankruptcy adjudication,it identifies control rights transfer risks as a critical mechanism that drives firms to reallocate inputs from capital to labor,thereby enriching the theoretical understanding of input adjustment mechanisms.Third,this study underscores the practical implications for policymakers,highlighting that while such reforms effectively expand employment,they do not necessarily upgrade labor quality.Future policies should aim to balance employment quantity with quality improvements to foster sustainable employment growth.
作者
余明桂
马林
强皓凡
YU Minggui;MA Lin;QIANG Haofan(School of Finance,Zhongnan University of Economics and Law;School of Business,the Chinese University of Hong Kong,china;School of Economics,Fudan University)
出处
《数量经济技术经济研究》
北大核心
2025年第4期69-90,共22页
Journal of Quantitative & Technological Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金重大项目(24ZDA043)
国家社会科学基金重点项目(22AZD132)
国家自然科学基金面上项目(72172158,71873039)
高等学校学科创新引智基地计划(B21038)
上海市“曙光计划”项目(11SG09)
中南财经政法大学中央高校基本科研业务费专项金(2722020PY010)。
关键词
破产司法
劳动雇佣
债权人
Judicial Reform of Bankruptcy
Corporate Employment
Creditor
作者简介
余明桂,教授,中南财经政法大学金融学院,电子邮箱:mingyu@zuel.edu.cn;马林,博士研究生,香港中文大学金融系,电子邮箱:mlzuel@126.com;通讯作者:强皓凡,博士研究生,复旦大学经济学院,电子邮箱:qianghaofan96@163.com。
