摘要
以知觉把握模态知识,如通过视觉看到某物本可能的另一情形是非常反直觉的。当代模态认识论者们也都默认:不存在知觉的模态知识。然而,这样一种未经考察的观点并不合理。通过澄清知觉知识在何种意义上为知觉的,可以找到一些知觉模态知识的例证。看似反常的知觉模态知识也许并非如人们想象的那般不合理。
It seems counterintuitive to grasp modal knowledge by perception,e.g.,to see that something could have been otherwise.Contemporary modal epistemologists also seem to acquiesce:there is no perceptual modal knowledge.However,such an unexamined view is not reasonable.On the basis of clarifying the meaning of knowl⁃edge as perception,some examples of perceptual modal knowledge can be found.Seemingly counterintuitive per⁃ceptual modal knowledge may not be so implausible as people think.
作者
钱彦臣
QIAN Yan-chen(Philosophy Department,China University of Political Science and Law,Beijing 102249,China)
出处
《科学技术哲学研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2024年第6期15-21,共7页
Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology
基金
国家社科基金重点项目“当代逻辑与语言哲学视域下的模态认识论研究”(20AZX015)
国家社科基金青年项目“脑机接口对个人同一性影响的伦理研究”(24CZX070)。
关键词
模态
模态知识
知觉
知觉知识
modality
modal knowledge
perception
perceptual knowledge
作者简介
钱彦臣(1994-),男,湖北荆门人,哲学博士,中国政法大学哲学系讲师,研究方向为逻辑哲学、知识论等。
