项目制下的道德风险与逆向选择:来自地表水环境治理的证据被引量：4

Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection under the Project System:Evidence from Environmental Governance in Surface Water

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摘要项目制作为中央对地方财政转移支付进而推进国家政策目标实现的重要手段,对国家治理意义重大,但其成效往往受央地政府间多任务委托—代理关系中激励不相容问题的制约。在拓展的多任务委托—代理模型框架中,本文利用2015~2018年全国地表水水质监测站点的时点水质数据,实证考察中国两类典型水环境治理项目的任务目标差异对地表水环境质量信息公开中数据操纵现象发生的影响,从经验层面揭示项目制下的道德风险和逆向选择困境。研究发现,全国水生态文明城市建设项目的期末验收增加了站点在Ⅲ类和Ⅳ类分级点上“低报”水质等级的概率,而重要饮用水水源地达标建设项目的年度审核增加了站点在Ⅱ类与Ⅲ类分级点上“高报”水质等级的倾向。项目约束条件与地方竞争激励是否匹配是水质数据操纵现象发生的重要原因。本文为优化央地公共服务治理体系、构建激励兼容的政府间协作关系提供了思路。 As an important means for the central government to transfer payments to local finances to promote the realization of national policy goals,the project system is of great significance to national governance.Because the project system can effectively mobilize the enthusiasm of local governments to develop the economy and handle public affairs on the premise of more accurately implementing the intentions of a higher-level government and its operating procedure includes strict prior declaration,approval,post-assessment,and acceptance processes,the project system is an important instrument for balancing regional economic growth and providing inclusive public services.Nevertheless,while the project system has played a promising role in a range of aspects,it has also produced many unintended consequences.The effectiveness of the project system is often undermined by the incentive incompatibility in the multi-task principal-agent relationship between central and local governments.To reveal the challenges of moral hazard and adverse selection under the project system from an empirical perspective with the time-point water quality data of the national surface water quality monitoring stations from 2015 to 2018,this study specifically examines the impact of the difference in mission objectives between two types of typical water environmental governance projects in China on the occurrence of data manipulation in the disclosure of surface water environmental quality information under the expanded multi-task principal-agent model framework.The result indicates that the final reception of the Construction Project of National Water Ecological Civilization City increases the probability that the site“underreports”the water quality level at the ClassⅢandⅣclassification points to pass the project acceptance,while the annual check of the Construction Project of Important Drinking Water Sources Up to Standard increases the tendency of sites to“overreport”water quality levels at the ClassⅡandⅢclassification points to fail to meet the standards and withdraw from the project.Whether the project constraints match the promotion incentives of local officials is an important reason for the occurrence of water quality data manipulation.This study complements the existing literature on the relationship between project systems and subsequent socioeconomic outcomes in the following three ways.First,investigating the possible data manipulation behavior in the disclosure of water environment quality information from the perspective of the project system expands the existing research field.Most of the existing literature focuses on examining the phenomenon of data manipulation itself and mainly focuses on economic growth indicators or a single index of air quality.Second,simultaneous consideration of moral hazard and adverse selection under the project system enriches our understanding of the multi-task principal-agent model.Existing research on the project system occurs more in the fields of sociology and political science to explain its governance logic and operating mechanism,and most of the research only focuses on the moral hazard problem in the project acceptance process.Third,this study uses time-point data with a large sample to determine the occurrence of data manipulation behavior and collects relevant data from various ways to explain its formation mechanism,and the results obtained have undergone a series of robustness tests and heterogeneity analysis.This makes the research results more robust and convincing.Overall,the current article provides important implications for optimizing the central-local public service governance system and building an incentive-compatible intergovernmental collaborative relationship.For example,it separates some functions to the vertical management of the central government to improve the output efficiency of environmental governance and public services and introduces third-party monitoring agencies in the process of environmental information disclosure.

作者张志坚王学渊洪芙蓉 ZHANG Zhijian;WANG Xueyuan;HONG Furong(School of Economics,Zhejiang Gongshang University;Decision Consultation Center of Taizhou Municipal Government)

机构地区浙江工商大学经济学院台州市政府决策咨询中心

出处《数量经济技术经济研究》 CSSCI CSCD 北大核心 2023年第7期201-224,共24页 Journal of Quantitative & Technological Economics

基金浙江省文化研究工程重点项目(22WH11-9Z) 浙江省软科学重点项目(2022C25010) 浙江省高校重大人文社科攻关计划项目(2023QN079)的资助。

关键词项目制道德风险逆向选择地表水治理环境信息公开 Project System Moral Hazard Adverse Selection Surface Water Governance Environmental Information Disclosure

分类号 F062.6 [经济管理—政治经济学]

作者简介张志坚,副教授,浙江工商大学经济学院,电子邮箱:zj_zhang@zjgsu.edu.cn;通讯作者:王学渊,教授,浙江工商大学经济学院,电子邮箱:wxyrocky@163.com;洪芙蓉,硕士,台州市政府决策咨询中心,邮箱:hfrsky@163.com。