摘要
数字经济的繁荣释放了平台企业内生的扩张属性,导致了平台利用跨市场竞争优势排除竞争的行为泛滥。平台封禁在行为外观、适用条件、抗辩理由等方面均难被纳入拒绝交易行为的规制框架。在行为动机上,封禁旨在巩固现有市场的支配地位或加强关联市场的竞争优势;在行为表现上,封禁本质上是优待自营业务的一种形式;在行为效果上,封禁能够产生跨市场的竞争扭曲。将封禁行为纳入自我优待的规制框架,能为克服商业生态化系统引发的市场失灵问题提供合理的分析基础。对封禁行为本质与种属的提炼也为厘清规制的基本原则、明确行为的构成要件及构建效果评估标准提供了强大理据,能够发现以封禁为代表的自我优待行为不应被概括禁止,而应根据其市场表现进行综合判断。
The prosperity of the digital economy has led to the wanton expansion of platforms and the frequent occurrence of cross-market monopolies.Platform blocking is difficult to be included in the regulatory framework for refusing deals in terms of behavioral performance,applicable conditions,and defense reasons.In terms of behavioral motivation,the blocking aims to consolidate the dominant position of the existing market or strengthen the competitive advantage of the related market;in terms of behavioral performance,the blocking is a form of self-preferencing;in terms of behavioral effect,the blocking can lead to distortive effects in cross-markets.It is a reasonable approach to incorporate platform blocking into the regulatory framework of self-preferencing,which can provide a reasonable analytical basis for overcoming the market failure caused by the digital business ecosystems.At the same time,the refinement of the characteristics and categories of platform blocking also provides a strong rationale for clarifying the basic principles of regulation,the elements of behavior,and evaluation standards for competitive effects and further finds that self-preferencing represented by platform blocking should not be prohibited in general,but should be comprehensively judged based on its market performance.
出处
《法学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第7期163-178,共16页
Law Science
基金
国家社科基金青年项目“应对数字市场反垄断制度变革的中国方案研究”(19CFX075)
教育部人文社会科学青年基金项目“竞争政策在数字市场中的适用问题研究”(18YJC820095)的阶段性成果。
关键词
平台竞争
平台封禁
自我优待
封锁效应
杠杆效应
platform competition
platform blocking
self-preferencing
foreclosure effects
leverage effect
