摘要
本文在考察董事高管责任保险对财务重述产生影响的基础上,分析高管权力对这一关系的调节效应。研究显示,那些已经购买D&O保险的公司随后发生财务重述的概率更高,而高管权力的增大则推升了D&O保险诱发的财务重述的概率。这一结果表明,我国上市公司引进D&O保险有着较为强烈的机会主义动机,而高管权力的增大对于上市公司机会主义行为的实施起到了推波助澜的作用。
On the basis of examining the influence of D＆O insurance on financial restatement, this paper analyzed how executive power regulated this relationship. The study showed that those companies which had purchased D＆O insurance were more likely to conduct financial restatements, and the increase in executive power would push up the probability of financial restatement which induced by D＆O insurance. The results indicated those companies which introduced D＆O insurance had stronger opportunistic motivation, and the executive power played an auxiliary role for the implementation of opportunistic behaviors.
出处
《保险研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第9期75-85,共11页
Insurance Studies
基金
国家自然科学基金项目"中国上市公司需求动因及其治理效应研究"(项目批准号:71562010)
"不同稳健水平下企业的财务信息披露差异化研究"(项目批准号:71662009)
海南省哲学社会科学规划课题"不同会计稳健机制下的企业财务信息披露差异研究"(项目批准号:HNSK(YB)17-4)的资助
作者简介
吴锡皓，管理学（会计学）博士，海南大学经济与管理学院副教授，研究方向：资本市场会计理论与方法；;程逸力，海南大学经济与管理学院硕士研究生，研究方向：资本市场会计理论与方法。
