摘要
中国的官僚体系呈现出一个独特现象,即政府部门尤其是地方政府雇佣了大量的编外人员。为什么会出现如此大规模的非正式人员?这样一个介乎于普通民众和正式官僚体系之间的模糊地带是如何形成的?这是中国基层治理中一个有趣的问题。本文通过对东部一个富裕县公安部门警辅队伍演变的个案研究,揭示了在地方政府职能扩张和编制严格受限的情况下,地方政府存在着不受财政部门和人大立法机构控制、主要受经费使用部门和地方主要负责人影响的财政支出行为。这种地方软财政支出,正是编外人员得以扩张的重要原因。
Since the 1980 s,the state building in China has made progress,and the governing ability of the government has strengthened. However,China's bureaucracy presents a unique case that the governments,especially the local ones,employ a lot of government staff without bianzhi. Why is there this gray zone between the ordinary people and the formal bureaucracy? This is an interesting question of local governance. Based on a single case study of the police department in a wealthy county in eastern China,this paper argues that the soft fiscal expenditure of the local governments is important for understanding the expansion of staff without bianzhi. Soft fiscal expenditure refers to expenditure influenced little by the financial department and the local People's Congress,but mainly by the local cadres and specific departments that are in need of informal staff.
出处
《社会学研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第1期146-167,245,共22页
Sociological Studies
基金
2014年度教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(14YJC810015)
对外经济贸易大学中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助(CXTD6-04)
