摘要
文章基于代理理论和产权理论分析框架,应用线性一阶段自回归模型,以2007-2014年我国沪深上市公司为研究样本,分析高管权力与盈余持续性的关系以及产权性质在其中扮演的角色。研究发现:高管权力越大,权力寻租行为动机越为强烈,公司盈余持续性越弱;进一步发现,国有产权会加剧高管权力与盈余持续性的敏感程度。
Based on the analytical framework of agency theory and property right theory, applying a linear stage autoregres- sion model and taking the listed companies ill Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2007 to 2014 as the research sample, the paper analyzes the relationship between executive power and earnings persistence as well as the role of property right in the relationship. The study finds that tire greater the executive power, the stronger the power rent-seeking motiva- tion, and tire weaker the corporate earnings persistence. Moreover, state-owned property right will intensify the sensitivity of executive power and earnings persistence.
出处
《华东经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第12期112-117,共6页
East China Economic Management
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71462014
71162010)
关键词
高管权力
产权性质
盈余持续性
executive power
property right
earnings persistence
作者简介
谢盛纹（1970-），男，江西瑞金人，教授，会计学博士，研究方向：审计与公司治理.
刘杨晖（1985-），男，江西兴国人，博士研究生，研究方向：审计与公司治理.
