董事及高管责任保险:激励还是自利?基于中国上市公司的实证检验被引量：62

D&O Insurance:Incentives or Self-interests?Evidence from Listed Firms in China

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摘要关于董事及高管责任保险究竟是通过激励董事和高管勤勉、进取,提升公司价值;还是诱发董事及高管的道德风险,助长其自利主义行为,削弱公司价值一直存在争议。论文以2002—2013年沪深A股上市公司为研究样本,采用treatment effect model纠正样本选择性偏差,实证结果表明,董责险可以带来公司价值的显著提升,这一结论对于非金融企业和金融企业同样成立。同时,董责险的价值提升效果会随着制度环境的变化而改变,具体而言,当投资者保护程度较高、公司面临被诉风险较大时,董责险的价值提升效果会更显著。在稳健性检验中,论文使用"董责险相对保额"这一连续变量替代"是否购买董责险"这一虚拟变量,以测度保障程度的变化对公司价值的影响,结论依然稳健。 This paper examines the relationship between the purchasing of D＆O insurance and firm value. Using a sampleof 12709 non-financial firm-year observations from 2002 to 2013, we find a positive relation between the use of D＆Oinsurance and firm＇s Tobin＇s Q after controlling self-selection bias with two-step treatment effect model. In addition, thevalue increasing effect of D＆O insurance is conditional on the institutional environment. Specifically, the higher thedegree of investor protection and the greater the sued risk of the company, the more significant the value increasingeffect. The above findings keep robust no matter we use the continuous variable ＂D＆O coverage＂ or we use the dummyvariable ＂D＆O decisions＂.

作者赵杨 John Hu

机构地区对外经济贸易大学国际商学院 Shdler college of Business

出处《中国软科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2014年第9期147-164,共18页 China Soft Science

基金国家自然科学基金重点项目(71332007) 国家自然科学基金项目(7124017) 国家社会科学基金重大项目(11&ZD004) 北京市哲学社会科学研究基地建设项目北京市软科学项目(Z131100004613026 Z14111000414017)

关键词董事及高管责任保险公司价值自选择偏差 D＆O insurance firm value self-selection bias treatment effect model

分类号 F204 [经济管理—国民经济]

作者简介赵杨（1983-），男，河南周口人，对外经济贸易大学国际商学院博士研究生，研究方向为：风险管理。

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