摘要
他心问题自提出以来就引起许多学者的关注,对于能否获知他心这一问题至今没有明确的答案。本文在维特根斯坦、罗素及斯特劳森对于他心问题的不同解答的基础上,从感受性角度出发探讨他心问题,认为关于他心知识的获得是可能的,但从根本上理解他心又是不可能的。
The problem of other minds has caused many scholars＇ no definite answer has achieved to the question that whether other attentions since its coming up, but minds are likely to be known. This article discusses the problem of other minds through qualia on the basis of Wittgenstein, Russell and Strawson, who ever had different opinions on this problem. This article holds that it is possible for other minds to be known, while it is impossible for other minds to be understood radically.
出处
《重庆理工大学学报（社会科学）》
CAS
2014年第2期81-83,122,共4页
Journal of Chongqing University of Technology（Social Science）
关键词
感受性
他心问题
本体论承诺
qualia
the problem of other minds
ontological commitment
作者简介
吴晓珊（1988-），女，广东普宁人，硕士研究生，研究方向：系统理论与系统管理、心灵哲学。
