摘要
本文利用2006—2009年我国市委书记和城商行的对应样本,考察了官员治理特征对城商行信贷投放的影响。结果表明,不同类型市委书记辖内城商行的信贷投放存在显著差异。从来源上来看,由外地晋升的市委书记辖内城商行会显著地扩张信贷;从去向上看,调任省、中央的市委书记任内城商行则会紧缩信贷,进一步的分析表明这种效应是由来自省、中央且调任省、中央的市委书记引致的,而退居二线市委书记辖内城商行却会增加贷款投放;从任期来看,整体而言,市委书记任期与城商行信贷显著正相关,但不同治理特征的市委书记任期与信贷关系也存在差异。
The paper exams the relationship between governance characteristics of local officials and credit supply of the City Commercial Banks （CCB）, using the corresponding sample of Municipal Party Committee Secretary （MPCS） and CCB during 2006--2009. The results indicate that there have significant differences in credit supply among CCB located in different types of MPCS. From the point of source, the CCB located in where MPCS from other city will significantly expand credit. And from the point of destination, the CCB located in where MPCS promoted to province or center will notably tighten credit, and further analy- sis show that this effect is due to the MPCS from province or center and then promoted to province or center. However, the CCB located in where MPCS relegated to second-tier will also significantly expand credit. From the point of tenure, MPCS＇s tenure has a positive cor- relation with CCB＇s credit overall, but there have different correlations between tenure of MPCS with different governance characteristics and CCB＇s credit.
出处
《经济学（季刊）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第3期1239-1260,共22页
China Economic Quarterly
基金
国家社科基金重大项目(10ZD&035)
国家自然科学基金项目(71172066)
教育部人文社科重点研究基地重大项目(08JJD630007)的阶段性研究成果
作者简介
通讯作者:钱先航,地址:天津市南开区卫津路94号南开大学公司治理研究中心,300071,Email:qxhsdu02@163.com。
