摘要
作为一种法律上允许的企业垄断或曰联合行为,专利共有的制度安排应当是立法对现实经济中个体在制度需求上的确认。但运用经济分析中常见的交易成本、博奕论等分析有关现行规定后,不难发现我国的专利共有制度安排在一定情形下反而增加了合作研发的交易成本,并有导致共有人竟相发放许可的倾向,以致许可利益被稀释、压低至边际陈本。因此,完善共有专利许可及其费用分配的规则势在必行,以降低交易成本、促进资源有效配置和经济效益最大化;同时,让各专利共有人必须在一定的许可协议下才能对外许可,以避免公地悲剧的可能。
As a legally allowed monopoly or joint action,patent co-ownership arrangement should be a kind of legislation confirmation on the individual needs existing in our practical economics.But reviewed by the commonly used economic analytical means such as transaction cost and game theory,our patent co-ownership arrangements are surprisingly found under circumstances that it brings out a burden to the transaction cost of co-development,and that it may dilute the owner＇s interests or even corner the interests to marginal cost due to the tendency of abused license by its co-owners.Therefore,it is necessary to make further study and improvement on patent license and profit distribution arrangement to lower down the transaction cost,and to reach the target of effective source distribution and profit maximization.Meanwhile,it is necessary to limit the patent license among the co-owners under a certain agreement to avoid the tendency of tragedy of commons.
出处
《北京科技大学学报（社会科学版）》
2011年第4期116-119,共4页
Journal of University of Science and Technology Beijing(Social Sciences Edition)
基金
国家社科基金项目(项目编号:09BFX036)
关键词
专利共有
交易成本
博弈论
公地悲剧
patent co-ownership
transaction cost
game theory
tragedy of commons
作者简介
孙敏洁（1974-），女，安徽寿县人。中南财经政法大学知识产权学院2009级博士。
曹新明（1961-）,男，法学博士，中南财经政法大学教授、博士生导师。
