摘要
中国公司股利政策深受证券监管政策(如再融资门槛政策)的深远影响。但我们认为,中国上市公司派现行为的高度离散性,可能并不能够完全用"再融资门槛政策"影响这一原由来解释,或者说,代理理论并不完全适用于我国公司股利政策的解释。本文用派现意愿与派现程度来定义公司的派现行为,基于信号理论并借鉴Skinner(2008)的模型来解释中国公司的派现行为,实证结果表明:公司派现与公司业绩质量存在某种相关性,具体为:盈利性强的公司其派现意愿越高,未来盈利性好的公司其当期现金股利支付率也越高。可见,公司派现行为具有较强的信息含量:派现意愿、派现程度可能是公司管理层向市场传递的一种信号。
Dividend policy of a public - listed company is still a controversial topic addressed today. The dividend policies of China listed companies are profoundly influenced by the regulatory policies, i.e. the hurdle policy of rights offerings. We demonstrate that higher variability of cash payout ratios among the listed companies in China will not be explained completely by the hurdle policy of rights offerings. That also means principal - agent theory would not be true when it comes to explain the reality of China. While using the intention and level of cash dividends to define ＂cash dividends behavior＂ （ CDB）, and basing on the signaling theory with the model of Skinner （2008）, this paper shows empirically that positive relationship would exist between CDB and the firm＇ s earnings quality. Essentially, CDB of a firm would show the higher information contents of that firm. Conclusions will be drawn that the intention and level of cash dividends could be a signal which released purposely by the management.
出处
《经济与管理研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第11期98-105,共8页
Research on Economics and Management
关键词
派现行为
盈余持续性
信号理论
Cash Dividends Behavior
Earnings Persistence
Signaling Theory
作者简介
高克智安徽工商职业学院会计系，副教授，合肥市，230041；
王辉安徽工商职业学院会计系，副教授；
王斌北京工商大学商学院，教授，北京，100048。
