摘要
在完全竞争的情况下,排污权交易市场是一种有效的污染控制手段。但是在寡头垄断市场中,排污权交易的效率会由于垄断效应而降低。本文证明,当产品市场是寡头垄断的情况下,由于排污权交易市场的价格接受行为,削减效率低的企业可以获得较多的排污权,使得它们在生产市场中更有竞争性,可能导致低产出率和高价格的市场均衡,并可能导致高成本的企业反而生成更多,最终使得行业的总产量减少。如果忽略寡头企业的边际生产成本的差异,指令控制对行业总产量基本不产生影响。
It is commonly suggested that market be used to control pollution when complete competition exists in markets.However,in oligopolistic markets,the efficiency in emission trade will be reduced due to monopoly effect.This paper demonstrates that when product markets are duopolistic,price-taking behavior in permits market will cause the transfer of licenses to the less efficient abatement firms,which then become more aggressive in the product markets,acquiring additional permits,thus probably causing the equil...
出处
《系统工程》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2010年第8期109-112,共4页
Systems Engineering
基金
上海市哲学社科规划基金青年项目(2008EZH001)
上海市教委科研创新项目(09YZ335)
国家自然科学基金资助项目(10671126)
