摘要
本文立足于中国渐进式的转轨路径,分析了转型期地方治理与银行改革的互动表现和影响。计划轨和市场轨的相互制约与影响,在地方治理与银行改革方面,突出地表现为地方政府在自身改革的不同阶段,从自身利益出发,利用银行改革中的制度缺陷,不断改变对银行金融资源的争夺方式,由初始的直接行政干预到对银行决策施加影响,再过渡到目前通过逃废银行债务等间接争夺银行资源,而中央政府和银行体系则通过不断完善自身的管理体制和健全风险管理机制来抵御地方政府的争夺。双方博弈的结果在相当长的时期内都对全社会金融资源的配置、货币政策的有效传导和金融微观主体的经营产生了深远的影响。本文建议从地方政府职能转换、投融资体制改革,以及深化金融体制改革、完善银行治理结构等方面入手,逐步形成地方治理和银行改革的良性互动。
Based on China's gradual reform, this paper analyzes the interactive influence between the local governance and banking reform in the transitional economy. The local governments continually scramble for financial resources by different means for their own interests. However, the central government and banks must be against the misbehaviors of local governments by perfecting their managing system. This game will have a great influence on the financial resources allocation, the effectiveness of monetary policy and the management of financial micro-agents in a long term. At last, this paper puts forward some proposals to the reform of local governance and financial system.
出处
《金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2005年第5期25-37,共13页
Journal of Financial Research
关键词
转型
地方治理
银行改革
互动
transition, local governance, banking reform, interaction
