摘要
本文以宏智科技的股权之争为例,研究了股权设置与公司治理效率的关系。研究结果发现,股权制衡结构并不能提高我国民营上市公司的治理效率,恰恰相反,董事会总是被某个控制性股东完全控制,并在巨大控制权收益的驱动下,不顾其他股东利益而将上市公司掏空,引起各股东之间激烈争夺公司控制权的局面。我们认为,被有些学者所称道的股权制衡模式,并不比被大家广泛诟病的“一股独大”更有效率。在我国当前市场环境中,股权设置不能解决公司治理中的根本问题,而加强保护投资者的法制建设,约束经营者的具体行为,才是提高公司治理效率的关键所在。
By the instance of tussle about stock ownership of Hongzhi Science and Technology Limited Company,we in this article have researched the relation between stock ownership setup and company's administering efficiency.Our study has discovered that the structure of check-and-balance stock ownership can by no means increase the governing efficiency of China's listed private companies; conversely, the board of directors has always and completely been controlled by a certain stockowner who reins in the company and who, driven by the enormous benefit from the controlling right, and regardless of the interest of other stockowners, has hollowed out the company by stealing or whatever means,triggering off situation in which various stockowners fiercely scrabble for the company's controlling right.In our opinion,the pattern of 'check-and balance stockownership'called by some scholars is not at all more efficient than the widely condemned pattern of'the only stockowner-big-wheel'—the pattern of a company having only one big stockowner who rules entirely over the company. Against China's present market background,the stockownership mechanism cannot untangle the fundamental problems in controlling companie.s;the key to increasing the efficiency of controlling companies is no other than furthering the legal construction that protects investors and restrains managers' concrete behavior.
出处
《管理世界》
CSSCI
北大核心
2004年第10期114-123,140,共11页
Journal of Management World
