摘要
本文分析了并购业绩承诺对于并购方上市公司未来股价暴跌风险的影响。一方面,依据不完全契约理论和信号理论,业绩补偿承诺可能起到降低契约摩擦和信号传递的积极作用,进而降低并购方未来股价暴跌风险;另一方面,基于并购业绩承诺制度的理论缺陷以及我国资本市场中代理冲突的特点,业绩补偿承诺也可能引致代理冲突变异并激发相关利益方的机会主义行为,反而加重股价暴跌风险。本文研究发现,并购业绩承诺使得上市公司未来股价暴跌风险加重,并且关联并购中的业绩承诺对于股价暴跌风险的影响更大,从而支持"代理观"假说。我们进一步检验了标的资产质量不确定性对于业绩承诺是否发挥信号机制的影响,发现无论标的质量不确定性或高或低业绩承诺均无法降低并购方未来股价暴跌风险。我们的研究表明,在我国现行制度背景下的并购业绩承诺制度存在显著的理论设计缺陷,因而未实现保护中小投资者并促进资本市场健康发展的政策初衷。
This paper investigates the impact of performance commitment in M&A transactions on acquiring firms’future crash risk.We find a positive relation between performance commitment and acquiring firms’future crash risk,and this result is more pronounced in related-party M&A deals.These findings are consistent with our prediction that performance commitment regulation may bring about negative consequences by providing the parties with private information an opportunity to overstate the values of inferior target assets;the stock price will suddenly drop when the accumulated hidden bad news release to the market.We further systematically discuss the shortcomings in the theories and regulation related to performance commitment in M&As.We document that the current performance commitment contract is designed as a costless promise with low default cost,resulting in the information insiders make use of the regulation loopholes to aggressively expropriate from less-informed minority shareholders.
出处
《会计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第4期37-44,共8页
Accounting Research
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71702196,71772181,71702036)
中央高校基本业务费项目(17wkpy16)
深圳市人文社会科学重点研究基地成果
关键词
并购业绩承诺
股价暴跌风险
代理问题
信号理论
信号成本
Performance Commitment in M&As
Stock Price Crash Risk
Agency Problem
Signal Theory
Signal Cost
作者简介
通讯作者:魏明海,mnswmh@mail.sysu.edu.cn。
