摘要
国家科研资助过程中,成果披露是解决国家、单位、个人之间的信息不对称关键手段,是维护科技安全、明晰产权归属、优化成果管理的重要基础,然而,我国成果披露的理论研究和制度建设尚不完善。本文基于委托代理理论提出了个人-单位、单位-国家双层道德风险模型,对比中美两国成果披露制度发现,美国综合采用激励机制和约束机制服务国家目标的实现,中国国家科研资助尽管有着科学而明晰的政策目标,在由“国家统管”到“国家授权”的过程中却没有建立起相应的保障机制,成果披露制度尚处于探索阶段,有必要强化制度建设、平衡权利结构、厘清功能定位,尽快建立科学合理的国家科研资助成果披露制度。
Guided by the concept of innovation-led development,China's scientific research funding system has been continually improved in recent years,and government R&D investment increased rapidly.The Chinese government's R&D investment scale has ranked second in the world and the gap with the United States has been narrowing.At the same time,the scale of results output grows rapidly,how to manage and make good use of state-funded invention have become the focus of society.As a key link of R&D investment and invention management,invention disclosure is the basis of invention ownership division,intellectual property protection,and technology transfer.However,the invention disclosure has not received enough attention in China,and the invention disclosure system is in the startup phase.Based on the principal-agent theory,this paper proposes an individual-unit,unit-country two-tier moral hazard model,and discusses the principal's incentive strategy and constraint strategy to deal with information asymmetry under different circumstances.It is found that the United States comprehensively uses incentive strategy and constraint strategy to serve the realization of national R&D fund goals.Although China's national scientific research funding has clear policy goals,there is no corresponding guaranteed mechanism established in the process from“country ownership”to"country authorization"transformation,and the invention disclosure system is still in the startup phase.First,China doesn’t provide a practical and effective system guarantee for policy objectives realization based on the invention disclosure.It is suggested that after the government withdraws from the administrative examination and invention management,it needs to establish a new supervision and guarantee mechanism to obtain invention information in a timely manner,so that the country exercise the rights of sponsors and implement science and technology policies.When the unit fails to perform its disclosure obligations,or the unit's behavior is detrimental to national interests,it can be corrected and punished timely.Secondly,China units lack enforcement rules and general standards for invention disclosure.Most universities and scientific institutes have not yet established an invention disclosure system to put forward specific requirements for inventors.It is difficult for units to obtain invention information in a timely and comprehensive manner.It is difficult to gain information of invention classification,which leads to the further weakening of the power of unit management.It is suggested that the state revise relevant legal documents to stipulate the inventor's invention disclosure behavior and provide an enforcement rule for the establishment of the individual-unit level invention disclosure.Finally,affected by the patent incentive policy,inventors pay more attention to the number of inventions rather than the value of the invention.The unit becomes the patent procedure handler instead of the invention owner,resulting in an abnormally high number of patents in China and the lack of the technology transfer.Insufficient and other practical problems lead to the waste of social resources and the deviation of national policy intentions.It is necessary to establish a scientific invention evaluation system as soon as possible,change the current situation of attracting inventors to disclose their invention by relying on economic incentives for patents.It’s also recommended that the government should improve the evaluation mechanism,optimize the incentive mechanism,introduce restraint measures,and promote inventors fulfill the obligation to disclose results to the unit.
作者
沈健
钟卫
徐洪
SHEN Jian;ZHONG Wei;XU Hong(IP Management Department,Renmin University of China,Beijing 100872,China;School of Public Administration and Policy,Renmin University of China,Beijing 100872,China;Research Department,Beijing Normal University,Beijing 100091,China)
出处
《科学学研究》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2023年第5期797-806,共10页
Studies in Science of Science
关键词
科研资助
成果披露
产权归属
成果管理
scientific research funding
invention disclosure
ownership of invention
invention management
作者简介
沈健(1980-),男,副研究员,博士;通讯作者:钟卫(1976-),男,副教授,博士,E-mail:zhongw@ruc.edu.cn;徐洪(1981-),女,副研究员,博士。
